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Labor and Employment Law
by W. Melvin Haas III*
W. Jonathan Martin II**
Alyssa K. Peters***
and Patricia-Anne Brownback****
I. INTRODUCTION
This Article surveys revisions to the Official Code of Georgia
Annotated (O.C.G.A.)1 and decisions interpreting Georgia law from
June 1, 2018 to May 31, 2019, 2 that affect labor and employment
relations for Georgia employers.
*Equity Partner and Macon Office Head, Constangy, Brooks, Smith & Prophete LLP,
Macon, Georgia. Emory University (B.A., 1968); University of Alabama (J.D., 1971).
Chapter Editor, THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW (John E. Higgins Jr. et al. eds., 7th ed.
2017). Member, State Bars of Georgia and Alabama.
**Equity Partner, Constangy, Brooks, Smith & Prophete LLP, Macon, Georgia.
University of Georgia (B.B.A., cum laude, 1991); Mercer University School of Law (J.D.,
magna cum laude, 1994). Member, Mercer Law Review (1992–1994); Administrative
Editor (1993–1994). Chapter Editor, THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW (John E. Higgins Jr. et
al. eds., 7th ed. 2017). Member, State Bar of Georgia.
***Partner, Constangy, Brooks, Smith & Prophete LLP, Macon, Georgia. University of
Georgia (B.A., magna cum laude, 2004); Georgia State University (J.D., magna cum
laude, 2008). Member, Georgia State Law Review (2006–2008). Contributing Editor, THE
DEVELOPING LABOR LAW (John E. Higgins Jr. et al. eds., 7th ed. 2017). Member, State Bar
of Georgia.
****Associate, Constangy, Brooks, Smith & Prophete, LLP, Macon, Georgia. Mercer
University (B.B.A., cum laude, 2013); Mercer University School of Law (J.D., cum laude,
2016). Member, Mercer Law Review (2014–2016). Member, State Bar of Georgia.
The Authors would like to thank Steven Grunberg for his hard work on the Article.
1. For an analysis of Georgia labor and employment law during the prior survey
period, see W. Melvin Haas III et al., Labor and Employment Law, Annual Survey of
Georgia Law, 70 MERCER L. REV. 125 (2018).
2. Attorneys practicing labor and employment law have a multitude of reference
sources for recent developments in federal legislation and case law. See generally THE
DEVELOPING LABOR LAW (John E. Higgins Jr. et al. eds., 7th ed. 2017); BARBARA
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II. RECENT LEGISLATION
A. Georgia’s Hope Act
Effective July 1, 2019, Georgia’s Hope Act (the Act)3 amends Chapter
12 of Title 16 of the O.C.G.A., providing for the production,
manufacturing, and dispensing of low THC oil. The Act now also
provides an exception to possession and purchase of certain quantities
of low THC oil.4 Patients in the registry were permitted to possess up to
twenty ounces of the oil, but they were required to purchase this oil
from out of state.5 In-state production and sale of low THC, coupled
with the expansion of individuals qualified for the registry,6 could mean
a greater number of employees using low THC oil. While the passage of
this legislation may raise questions for Georgia employers, the
carve-out provision for employers in O.C.G.A. § 16-12-191(g)7 remains
intact.8 Employers are not required to:
permit or accommodate the use, consumption, possession, transfer,
display, transportation, purchase, sale, or growing of marijuana in
any form, or to affect the ability of an employer to have a written zero
tolerance policy prohibiting the on-duty, and off-duty, use of
marijuana, or prohibiting any employee from having a detectable
amount of marijuana in such employee’s system while at work.9

In a nut shell, the new legislation seems designed to expand the
network of dispensaries, expand the business opportunities for the
manufacturing of the oil, and expand the list of illnesses that would
LINDEMANN & PAUL GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW (C. Geoffrey Weirich
et al. eds., 5th ed. 2012); W. Jonathan Martin II et al., Labor and Employment Law,
Eleventh Circuit Survey, 69 MERCER L. REV. 1223 (2018); Daily Labor Report, BLOOMBERG
BNA, https://news.bloomberglaw.com/daily-labor-report/ (last visited Oct. 9, 2019).
Accordingly, this Article is not intended to cover the latest developments in federal labor
and employment law. Rather, this Article is intended only to cover legislative and judicial
developments arising under Georgia state law during the survey period.
3. Ga. H.R. Bill 324, Reg. Sess. (2019).
4. Id. It is now “lawful for any person to possess, purchase, or have under his or her
control 20 fluid ounces or less of low THC oil if such substance is in a pharmaceutical
container labeled by the manufacturer indicating the percentage of tetrahydrocannabinol
therein . . . .” O.C.G.A. § 16-12-191(a)(1) (2019).
5. See Ga. H.R. Bill 324, Reg. Sess. § 2 (2019).
6. Those with Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) now qualify for the registry.
O.C.G.A. § 31-2A-18(a)(O) (2019).
7. O.C.G.A. § 16-12-191(g) (2019).
8. See W. Melvin Haas III et al., Labor and Employment Law, Annual Survey of
Georgia Law, 67 MERCER L. REV. 91, 92–94 (2015).
9. O.C.G.A. § 16-12-191(g).
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authorize use of the oil. However, it does not appear to have the effect of
(and specifically disavows) the accommodation of THC at work. 10
B. Changes in Unemployment Weekly Benefit Amounts
Effective May 6, 2019, Georgia House Bill 373 11 revises subsections
(b) and (c) of O.C.G.A. § 34-8-193,12 relating to the determination of
weekly benefits amounts. Beginning on July 1, 2019, when the weekly
amount “would be more than $26.00 but less than $55.00, the
individual’s weekly benefit amount will be $55.00, and no weekly
benefit amount shall be established for less than $55.00.” 13 Also, “[f]or
claims filed on or after July 1, 2019, the maximum weekly benefit
amount shall not exceed $365.00.”14
C. Changes in Workers’ Compensation Rates
Senate Bill 13515 amended subsection (a) of O.C.G.A. § 34-9-20016
relating to compensation for medical care, treatment, and supplies,
among others. For non-catastrophic injuries occurring after July 1,
2013, the maximum period of 400 weeks shall not be applicable to
certain durable medical equipment (DME) and prosthetic devices. 17

10. Under the Drug Enforcement Agency’s Final Rule establishing a new drug code
for marijuana extract, if a product, such as oil from cannabis seeds, consisted solely of
parts of the cannabis plant excluded from the Controlled Substances Act definition of
marijuana, such product would not be included in the new drug code or in the drug code
for marijuana even if it contained trace amounts of cannabinoids. Clarification of the New
Drug Code (7350) for Marijuana Extract, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE DRUG ENF’T ADMIN.
DIVERSION
CONTROL
DIV.,
https://www.deadiversion.usdoj.gov/schedules/marijuana/m_extract_7350.html
(last
visited Nov. 1, 2019).
11. Ga. H.R. Bill 373, Reg. Sess. (2019).
12. O.C.G.A. § 34-8-193(b)–(c) (2019).
13. O.C.G.A. § 34-8-193(b).
14. O.C.G.A. § 34-8-193(c)(4) (2019).
15. Ga. S. Bill 135, Reg. Sess. § 3 (2019).
16. O.C.G.A. § 34-9-200(a) (2019).
17. O.C.G.A. § 34-9-200(a)(3)(A)(i) & (iii) (2019).
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III. WRONGFUL TERMINATION
A. Employment At-Will
Georgia’s employers are protected from wrongful termination
lawsuits by the doctrine of “employment at will.”18 Whereas the doctrine
of employment at will has been eroded in other jurisdictions by public
policy exceptions,19 the doctrine of employment at will remains strong
in Georgia.20 It is protected by statute 21 and contract provisions
specifying “‘permanent employment,’ ‘employment for life,’ [and]
‘employment until retirement,’”22 or contracts specifying an annual
salary do alter the application of the doctrine. 23 Only employment
contracts specifying a definite period of employment are actionable as a
breach of contract, and any employment beyond that period becomes
employment at-will.24
Similarly, oral promises between an employer and employee will not
modify the doctrine; absent a written contract, an employee’s status
remains at-will.25
In Shelnutt v. Mayor of Savannah,26 Christopher Shelnutt and
twenty-one other firefighters challenged the trial court’s grant of
summary judgment for the City of Savannah (the City). 27 The
18. An “at-will employment” relationship is one “that may be terminated at any time”
with or without cause by the employer or the employee. Employment at Will, BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
19. Haas et al., supra note 1, at 126 (“[E]mployment at-will in other jurisdictions may
be weakening.”).
20. See, e.g., H&R Block E. Enters., Inc. v. Morris, 606 F.3d 1285, 1294 (11th Cir.
2010) (quoting Nida v. Echols, 31 F. Supp. 2d 1358, 1376 (N.D. Ga. 1998)); Fink v. Dodd,
286 Ga. App. 363, 365, 649 S.E.2d 359, 362 (2007) (quoting Jellico v. Effingham Cty., 221
Ga. App. 252, 253, 71 S.E.2d 36, 37 (1996)) (“The employer[ ] with or without cause and
regardless of its motives may discharge the employee without liability.”); Reid v. City of
Albany, 276 Ga. App. 171, 172, 622 S.E.2d 875, 877 (2005) (quoting Reilly v. Alcan
Aluminum Corp., 272 Ga. 279, 280, 528 S.E.2d 238, 240 (2000)) (“[T]his bar to wrongful
discharge claims in the at-will employment context ‘is a fundamental statutory rule
governing employer–employee relations in Georgia.’”); see also Wilson v. City of Sardis,
264 Ga. App. 178, 179, 590 S.E.2d 383, 385 (2003) (citing Duck v. Jacobs, 739 F. Supp.
1545, 1548 (S.D. Ga. 1990)).
21. O.C.G.A. § 34-7-1 (2019).
22. Ga. Power Co. v. Busbin, 242 Ga. 612, 613, 250 S.E.2d 442, 443 (1978).
23. Ikemiya v. Shibamoto Am., 213 Ga. App. 271, 273, 444 S.E.2d 351, 353 (1994).
24. Schuck v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Ga., Inc., 244 Ga. App. 147, 148, 534
S.E.2d 533, 534 (2000).
25. Balmer v. Elan Corp., 278 Ga. 227, 228–29, 599 S.E.2d 158, 161 (2004).
26. 349 Ga. App. 499, 826 S.E.2d 379 (2019).
27. This trial court decision was on remand from the Georgia Court of Appeals case of
Shelnutt 1, wherein the Georgia Court of Appeals had reversed the trial court’s dismissal
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firefighters claimed that the City was not honoring its contractual
obligation because the City was not paying them in accordance with the
terms of the pay policy. 28 Under the pay policy, agreed to by the
firefighters at the beginning of employment, the firefighters would
receive gradual increases in pay if they were promoted. This policy was
amended throughout the years leading up to Shelnutt’s complaint, with
different plaintiff firefighters being hired under different versions of the
pay policy.29 The trial court originally dismissed the firefighters’
complaint because the court found them to be at-will employees of the
City and promises of a future change in compensation were not
enforceable.30 Shelnutt 1 reversed this decision, holding that while
future promises of “change in compensation are generally
unenforceable—each firefighter ‘may be able to point to the version of
the pay policy in effect at the time he or she was hired and show that it
provided for a definite percentage pay increase conditioned on
promotion to a supervisory position.’” 31 On remand, the trial court again
sided with the City, granting summary judgment for the remaining
twenty-one firefighters and finding that the City was in compliance
with its pay policy with the firefighters.32 On appeal, the firefighters
argued that the trial court erroneously interpreted the court’s decision
in Shelnutt 1 by finding that only the pay policy in effect at the time of
a firefighter’s hire could give rise to contractual rights in an at-will
relationship.33 The Georgia Court of Appeals disagreed, reaffirming its
holding that “a promise of a future change in compensation generally is
unenforceable since neither party is bound to continue performance
under the contract at all, this rule does not apply to a promise of future
compensation made at the beginning of the employment relationship.
Such a promise is enforceable.”34

of Shelnutt’s complaint. Shelnutt v. Mayor of Savannah, 333 Ga. App. 446, 454, 776
S.E.2d 650, 657 (2015).
28. Shelnutt, 349 Ga. App. at 500, 826 S.E.2d at 381 (citing Shelnutt, 333 Ga. App. at
446, 776 S.E.2d at 652).
29. Id. There was not a pay policy in place when twenty-two of the original forty-nine
firefighters were hired. Id. at 501, 826 S.E.2d at 382.
30. Id. at 501, 826 S.E.2d at 382.
31. Id. (quoting Shelnutt, 333 Ga. App. at 451–52, 776 S.E.2d at 656).
32. Id. at 499, 826 S.E.2d at 381.
33. Id. at 501, 826 S.E.2d at 382. The firefighters had an interest in the court holding
that their claims arose at each pay period, and not when they were initially promoted, so
as to avoid having the statute of limitations run. See id.
34. Id. at 502, 826 S.E.2d at 383 (quoting Shelnutt, 333 Ga. App. at 451, 776 S.E.2d
at 655).
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B. Breach of Contract (Other than At-Will)
For an employment agreement to be enforceable, it must include all
traditional elements of a contract: offer, acceptance, and
consideration.35 Additionally, it must include all necessary terms, and
the terms must be definite.36
In Phillips v. Adams, Jordan & Herrington, P.C.,37 the Georgia Court
of Appeals upheld a trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of
the defendant, a law firm (the firm), holding that the employment
agreement between the plaintiff and the firm was too indefinite to be
enforced.38 In December 2013, when hired, the plaintiff entered into an
employment agreement with the firm. The agreement outlined that
following successful resolution of the case, the plaintiff “would be paid a
‘portion of the fee,’ ‘on a case by case basis,’ based on ‘the extent’ of his
work on the case.”39 In addition, either party could terminate the
agreement “upon thirty (30) days written notice.” 40
In 2014, the plaintiff requested to be switched to a salary with the
understanding that his pay from cases as outlined in the December
2013 agreement would be reduced as a result.41 As the plaintiff began to
successfully resolve cases, he perceived that his compensation was not
in line with the December 2013 agreement. The firm responded to his
concerns in writing, stating that the plaintiff requested to be paid on a
salary as opposed to the pay structure under the December 2013
agreement. The plaintiff subsequently sued the firm claiming breach of
contract and quantum meruit.42
The court of appeals held the December 2013 agreement to be
unenforceable.43 For an employment contract to be enforceable, “the
promise of future compensation must . . . be for an exact amount or
based upon a formula or method for determining the exact amount of
the [payment].”44 The court went on to state that where future
compensation is based “at least in part” by “future exercise of

35. See generally JAMES W. WIMBERLY, GEORGIA EMPLOYMENT LAW §§ 1–2 (3d ed.
2000).
36. Id.
37. 350 Ga. App. 184, 828 S.E.2d 414 (2019).
38. Id. at 184, 828 S.E.2d at 415.
39. Id. at 185, 828 S.E.2d at 415.
40. Id. at 185, 828 S.E.2d at 416.
41. Id. at 185–86, 828 S.E.2d at 416.
42. Id. at 186, 828 S.E.2d at 416.
43. Id. at 187, 828 S.E.2d at 417.
44. Id. at 186, 828 S.E.2d at 416 (quoting Arby’s, Inc. v. Cooper, 265 Ga. 240, 241, 454
S.E.2d 488, 489 (1995)).
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discretion” then that is essentially a promise to change compensation in
the future, which is unenforceable.45 The court focused on the firm’s
ability to change the plaintiff’s compensation in the future based on
arbitrary terms, such as “the extent” of his work “fairly determined by
the partners,” in declining to find the employment contract
enforceable.46 The court noted, and the plaintiff also admitted in his
testimony, there was no formula to determine his compensation
between himself and the firm.47 In other words, there was no way to
value his contributions to the firm and therefore the agreement was too
vague to be enforceable.48 While the court granted summary judgment
on the breach of contract claim, it allowed the quantum meruit claim to
proceed to trial to determine if the December 2013 agreement was
terminated and, if not, if the plaintiff was entitled to compensation for
the benefit provided to the firm.49
C. Whistleblower Act
Georgia’s Whistleblower Act (GWA) provides: “No public employer
shall retaliate against a public employee for disclosing a violation of or
noncompliance with a law, rule, or regulation to either a supervisor or a
government agency . . . .”50 A public employee establishes a prima facie
violation of the GWA by proving four elements: “(1) [the plaintiff] was
employed by a public employer; (2) [the plaintiff] made a protected
disclosure or objection; (3) [the plaintiff] suffered an adverse
employment action; and (4) there is some causal relationship between
the protected activity and the adverse employment action.” 51 The
establishment of a prima facie case creates a presumption of retaliation
which the employer rebuts by producing a legitimate, non-retaliatory

45. Id. at 187, 828 S.E.2d at 416–17 (quoting Cooper, 265 Ga. at 242, 454 S.E.2d at
489).
46. Id. at 187, 828 S.E.2d at 417.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 188, 828 S.E.2d at 417–18.
50. O.C.G.A. § 45-1-4(d)(2) (2019).
51. Albers v. Ga. Bd. of Regents of Univ. Sys. of Ga., 330 Ga. App. 58, 61, 766 S.E.2d
520, 523 (2014); see Forrester v. Ga. Dep’t of Human Servs., 308 Ga. App. 716, 722, 708
S.E.2d 660, 666 (2011).
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reason for the employment action.52 “The burden then returns to the
plaintiff to prove that the employer’s reasons are pretextual.” 53
In Franklin v. Pitts,54 the Georgia Court of Appeals overruled in part
its decision in Freeman v. Smith,55 holding that “adverse employment
action” in the GWA means action similar to “discharge, suspension, or
demotion.”56 The plaintiff, a county employee whose job included the
handling of patient records, filed a grievance expressing concerns that
when she was moved from a private office to a cubicle, the county was
violating confidentiality requirements under the Health Insurance
Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) 57 by exposing patient
information to the general public. The plaintiff claimed that she was
retaliated against as a result of her grievance because some of her work
duties were reassigned, she had difficulties obtaining leave that did not
exist pre-grievance, and she was not selected for two separate
promotions.58
The Georgia Court of Appeals held that the plaintiff failed to show
that she suffered a serious and material change in the terms,
conditions, or privileges of her employment.59 During its analysis, the
court concluded that its previous decision in Freeman, regarding the
standard for determining whether a public employee met the burden of
proving “adverse employment action” under the GWA, was incorrect. 60
In Freeman, the court applied the Burlington Northern and Santa Fe
Railway Co. v. White61 standard to the GWA.62 The standard for
retaliation under Burlington is “viewed from the perspective of a
reasonable employee, when previously courts looked to concrete changes
in the employee’s status, such as firings, demotions, or withheld pay

52. Forrester, 308 Ga. App. at 721–22, 708 S.E.2d at 665–66 (adopting the
burden-shifting analysis applied in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792
(1973)).
53. United States ex rel. Parato v. Unadilla Health Care Ctr., Inc., 787 F. Supp. 2d
1329, 1342 (M.D. Ga. 2011).
54. 349 Ga. App. 544, 826 S.E.2d 427 (2019).
55. 324 Ga. App. 426, 750 S.E.2d 739 (2013).
56. Franklin, 349 Ga. App. at 546, 826 S.E.2d at 431 (quoting O.C.G.A. § 45-1-4(a)(5)
(2019)).
57. 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-6 (2019).
58. Franklin, 349 Ga. App. at 544–45, 826 S.E.2d at 430–31.
59. Id. at 557 n.17, 826 S.E.2d at 438 n.17.
60. Id. at 552, 826 S.E.2d at 435.
61. 548 U.S. 53 (2006).
62. Franklin, 349 Ga. App. at 552, 826 S.E.2d at 435.
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raises.”63 The court held that Freeman misapplied this standard to the
GWA:
Although the [GWA] does not define “adverse employment action,”
the definition of “retaliate” or “retaliation” makes clear that an
“adverse employment action” must be “taken by a public employer
against a public employee in the terms or conditions of employment
for disclosing a violation of or noncompliance with a law, rule, or
regulation to either a supervisor or government agency.”64

Instead, the court held that Freeman should have interpreted the
phrase “any other adverse employment action” in the GWA “to mean
employment action analogous to or of a similar kind or class as
‘discharge, suspension, or demotion.’”65
In making this determination, the court relied on the standard used
in federal decisions, which is that “an employee must show that [he]
suffered a serious and material change in the terms, conditions, or
privileges of [his] employment.”66 Also, “[t]he employee’s subjective
perception of the seriousness of the change is not controlling;” the issue
of whether or not adverse employment action took place should be
viewed from the eyes of a reasonable employee under the same
circumstances.67 Here, because the plaintiff only offered evidence of
“busy work” being imposed on her in retaliation for her grievance, the
court held it was the type of subjective characterization that “should not
be considered when determining whether an adverse employment
action . . . occurred.”68
IV. RESPONDEAT SUPERIOR
A. Vicarious Liability
Under Georgia law, an employer may be held vicariously liable for
the negligence or intentional torts of its employees under the doctrine of
respondeat superior.69 A plaintiff establishes liability by proving the
following two elements: (1) the employee was acting in furtherance of

63. Id. at 551–52, 826 S.E.2d at 434 (quoting Brathwaite v. School Bd. of Broward
Cty., Fl., 763 F. App’x 856, 860 (11th Cir. 2019)).
64. Id. at 551, 826 S.E.2d at 435 (quoting O.C.G.A. § 45-1-4(a)(5) (2019)).
65. Id. at 554, 826 S.E.2d at 436 (quoting O.C.G.A. § 45-1-4(a)(5) (2019)).
66. Id. at 555, 826 S.E.2d at 437 (quoting Walker v. Indian River Transp. Co., 741 F.
App’x 740, 749 (11th Cir. 2018)).
67. Id.
68. Id. at 556, 826 S.E.2d at 437.
69. See CHARLES R. ADAMS III, GEORGIA LAW OF TORTS § 7:2 (2017–2018 ed.).
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the employer’s business; and (2) the employee was acting within the
scope of the employer’s business.70
In Duvall v. Cronic,71 the Georgia Court of Appeals addressed
liability in the context of a fraudulent vehicle sale by an employee. 72
Kerrie Bundy and Jon Cronic, president of K&J, an internet car sales
business, entered into a business venture, and Cronic agreed to provide
Bundy with the use of a luxury vehicle. Bundy then sold, without
Cronic’s authorization, the luxury vehicle to Duvall Ford Company
(Duvall). Cronic and K&J subsequently brought action against Duvall
for conversion, and Duvall brought counterclaims against Cronic and
K&J for vicarious liability related to Bundy’s acts. The trial court
denied summary judgment for Cronic and K&J on the vicarious liability
claims.73
The court of appeals held that Cronic was entitled to summary
judgment while K&J was not.74 The court noted there was not enough
evidence to support a finding that a principal–agent relationship
existed between Bundy and Cronic.75 “The relation of principal and
agent arises wherever one person, expressly or by implication,
authorizes another to act for him or subsequently ratifies the acts of
another in his behalf.”76 Here, Duvall failed to present evidence that
Bundy was employed by Cronic, that Cronic authorized Bundy to act on
his behalf, or that Cronic later ratified her actions. 77 Therefore,
summary judgment was appropriate for Cronic.78
This, however, was not the case with K&J. The court held that
Bundy was an employee of K&J because she was managing K&J’s
internet car sales at the time she sold the luxury car to Duvall. 79 For
K&J to be vicariously liable for Bundy’s tortious acts against Duvall,
“[she] must have been acting in furtherance of and within the scope of
K&J’s business.”80 The court held that this is typically a question of
fact, and the mere fact that the tort was intentional does not mean it

70. Id.
71. 347 Ga. App. 763, 820 S.E.2d 780 (2018).
72. Id. at 763–64, 820 S.E.2d at 783.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 772, 820 S.E.2d at 789.
75. Id.
76. Id. (quoting O.C.G.A. § 10-6-1 (2019)).
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 772–73, 820 S.E.2d at 789.
80. Id. at 772, 820 S.E.2d at 789 (citing Chorey, Taylor & Feil, P. C. v. Clark, 273 Ga.
143, 144, 539 S.E.2d 139, 140 (2000)).
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was not “in furtherance of and within the scope of K&J’s business.” 81
Because the court was not able to determine as a matter of law if
Bundy’s acts were entirely disconnected from her employer’s internet
car sales business,82 summary judgment was not appropriate for K&J.83
In Lucas v. Beckman Coulter, Inc.,84 on remand from the Georgia
Supreme Court,85 the Georgia Court of Appeals adopted the judgment of
the supreme court.86 The court held that an employer is not liable for
firearm-related tort liability under O.C.G.A. § 16-11-135(e)87 when an
employee negligently discharges their firearm. 88
In Manners v. 5 Star Lodge and Stables, LLC,89 the Georgia Court of
Appeals held that a lodge employee was not acting within the scope of
his employment when he accidentally shot a customer on the lodge
premises.90 Manners, a visitor of 5 Star Lodge, brought a respondeat
superior claim under O.C.G.A. § 51-2-2 against the lodge and its owner
when she was accidentally shot by the manager’s boyfriend, Sisson,
while on the premises.91 Manners claimed that Sisson was a lodge
employee and that he was engaged in lodge business when the shooting
occurred because she was there to discuss lodge business with the
manager and Sisson. However, the shooting occurred before the
discussion began, which Manners believed would be enough that a jury
could find that Sisson was engaged in lodge business when he shot
Manners.92
The court affirmed the trial court’s grant of summary judgment for
the lodge.93 Under O.C.G.A. § 51-2-2, “[e]very person shall be liable for
torts committed by his wife, his child, or his servant by his command or
in the prosecution and within the scope of his business, whether the

81. Id.; see O.C.G.A. § 51-2-2 (2019).
82. Duvall, 347 Ga. App. at 773, 820 S.E.2d at 789. The tortious act involved selling a
vehicle, and internet vehicle sales were Bundy’s responsibility at K&J. Id. at 772, 820
S.E.2d at 789.
83. Id. at 773, 820 S.E.2d at 789.
84. 348 Ga. App. 505, 823 S.E.2d 826 (2019).
85. Lucas v. Beckman Coulter, Inc., 303 Ga. 261, 811 S.E.2d 369 (2018). For an
analysis of this supreme court decision, see Haas et al., supra note 1, at 136–37.
86. Lucas, 348 Ga. App. at 506, 823 S.E.2d at 828.
87. O.C.G.A. § 16-11-135(e) (2019).
88. Lucas, 348 Ga. App. at 510–11, 823 S.E.2d at 831.
89. 347 Ga. App. 738, 820 S.E.2d 754 (2018).
90. Id. at 740, 820 S.E.2d at 757.
91. Id. at 738, 820 S.E.2d at 755.
92. Id. at 740, 820 S.E.2d at 756–57.
93. Id. at 740, 820 S.E.2d at 757.
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same are committed by negligence or voluntarily.” 94 Also, “[w]hen a
servant causes an injury to another, the test to determine if the master
is liable is whether or not the servant was at the time of the injury
acting within the scope of his employment and on the business of the
master.”95 Therefore, the court held that because there was no lodge
business being discussed at the time of the shooting, regardless of
Manners’ purpose for being there, Sisson was not acting within the
scope of his employment, so the lodge could not be held liable under
respondeat superior.96
V. BUSINESS TORTS
A. Breach of Fiduciary Duty
In Department of Labor v. McConnell,97 the Georgia Supreme Court
held that Georgia Department of Labor (GDOL) employees did not owe
Georgia citizens a fiduciary duty to protect their personal information
under the trustee clause of the Georgia Constitution. 98 GDOL
employees had inadvertently disclosed the personal information of over
1,000 citizens of Cherokee, Cobb, and Fulton counties.99 McConnell
argued that GDOL employees owed them a fiduciary duty under the
trustee clause, “[p]ublic officers are the trustees and servants of the
people and are at all times amenable to them;” 100 and the clause applies
“when a public officer ha[s] definitely benefitted financially (or
definitely stood to benefit financially) as a result of simply performing
[his or her] official duties.”101
The plaintiffs’ complaint not did not allege that there was any
financial gain or benefit by these public officers, and the plaintiffs also
failed to show “a special relationship of trust or mutual confidence with
the [GDOL or its employees].”102 Because the exchange of personal
information between citizens and a government agency is a common

94. Id. at 739, 820 S.E.2d at 756 (quoting O.C.G.A. § 51-2-2).
95. Id. (quoting Hicks v. Heard, 286 Ga. 864, 865, 692 S.E.2d 360, 361 (2010)).
96. Id. at 740, 820 S.E.2d at 757.
97. 305 Ga. 812, 828 S.E.2d 352 (2019).
98. Id. at 817, 828 S.E.2d at 358; see GA. CONST. art. I, § 2, para. 1.
99. McConnell, 305 Ga. at 812–13, 828 S.E.2d at 356.
100. Id. at 816–17, 828 S.E.2d at 358–59 (quoting GA. CONST. art. I, § 2, para. 1).
101. Id. at 817, 828 S.E.2d at 359 (quoting City of Columbus v. Ga. Dep’t of Transp.,
292 Ga. 878, 882, 742 S.E.2d 728, 732 (2013)).
102. Id.
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occurrence and necessary for citizens to receive benefits, the court held
this was insufficient to show a fiduciary relationship.103
B. Negligent Hiring, Retention, and Supervision
Employers in Georgia may be held liable for negligent hiring,
retention, and supervision. That is, “[t]he employer is bound to exercise
ordinary care in the selection of employees and not to retain them after
knowledge of incompetency.”104 Accordingly, the employer has a duty to
“warn other employees of dangers incident to employment that ‘the
employer knows or ought to know but which are unknown to the
employee.’”105 The successful plaintiff must prove the employer hired an
employee whom “the employer knew or should have known posed a risk
of harm to others where it [was] reasonably foreseeable from the
employee’s tendencies or propensities that the employee could cause the
type of harm sustained by the plaintiff.” 106 Negligent hiring, retention,
and supervision are ordinarily issues for a jury,107 except “where the
evidence is plain, palpable[,] and undisputable.” 108
In New Star Realty, Inc. v. Jungang PRI USA, LLC,109 the court of
appeals held “that a franchisor [may] be held liable for the negligent
training and supervision of franchisee employees under certain
[conditions].”110 In this case, New Star Georgia was a franchisee of New
Star California, a residential and commercial real estate business. After
the owner and president of New Star Georgia misappropriated escrow
funds in a real estate transaction, Jungang PRI USA, LLC (Jungang),
brought suit against New Star California for negligent hiring, training,
or supervision of its franchisee. The trial court entered judgment in
favor of Jungang.111
On appeal, New Star California argued it could not be held liable for
negligent hiring because New Star Georgia’s owner and president was
not an employee of New Star California. 112 The court of appeals agreed
103. Id. at 817–18, 828 S.E.2d at 359.
104. O.C.G.A. § 34-7-20 (2019).
105. Tecumseh Prods. Co. v. Rigdon, 250 Ga. App. 739, 740, 552 S.E.2d 910, 912 (2001)
(quoting O.C.G.A. § 34-7-20 (2001)).
106. Munroe v. Universal Health Servs., Inc., 277 Ga. 861, 863, 596 S.E.2d 604, 606
(2004) (internal quotation marks omitted).
107. Tecumseh, 250 Ga. App. at 741, 552 S.E.2d at 912.
108. Munroe, 277 Ga. at 864, 596 S.E.2d at 607 (quoting Robinson v. Kroger Co., 268
Ga. 735, 739, 493 S.E.2d 403, 408 (1997)).
109. 346 Ga. App. 548, 816 S.E.2d 501 (2018).
110. Id. at 562, 816 S.E.2d at 513.
111. Id. at 548–49, 816 S.E.2d at 504.
112. Id. at 561, 816 S.E.2d at 512.
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and noted that normally “there can be no claim for negligent hiring,”
retention, or supervision when the defendant is not the employer of the
individual in question.113 However, “a franchisor can be held liable for
negligent training and supervision of franchisee employees under
certain circumstances if the franchisor undertook a duty to involve itself
in the day-to-day operations of the franchisee or assumed the right to
control the manner in which the franchisee executed its work.” 114 For
Jungang to succeed on its negligent training and supervision claims, it
would have to produce evidence that “New Star California exercised
control over New Star Georgia’s daily operations . . . .”115 Here, New
Star Georgia’s owner and president was not subjected to day-to-day
control by New Star California; thus, New Star California could not be
held liable as a franchisor for negligent training and supervision. 116
C. Restrictive Covenants
In 2011, the Georgia Constitution was amended to provide courts
with greater flexibility in analyzing and enforcing covenant
restrictions.117 Specifically, the amendment allows courts to blue pencil
agreements made after 2011 rather than invalidate the entire
agreement.118 Agreements predating the amendment may not be blue
penciled;119 instead, they are strictly interpreted and upheld only when
the restrictive covenant is specific—and reasonable—as to duration,
geographic restriction, and scope of the activities prohibited. 120

113. Id. at 562, 816 S.E.2d at 513 (citing Cobra 4 Enters. v. Powell-Newman, 336 Ga.
App. 609, 615 n.4, 785 S.E.2d 556, 562 n.4 (2016)).
114. Id. See Hyde v. Schlotzsky’s, Inc., 254 Ga. App. 192, 194, 561 S.E.2d 876, 878
(2002).
115. New Star Realty, Inc., 346 Ga. App. at 562–63, 816 S.E.2d at 513; see Hyde, 254
Ga. App. at 194, 561 S.E.2d at 878 (holding that a restaurant franchisor could not be held
liable for alleged negligence in training, supervision, and inspection of franchisee, where
there was no evidence the franchisor “undertook a duty to involve itself in the day-to-day
operation of the restaurant or that it assumed the right to control the manner of
executing the work in the restaurant.”).
116. New Star Realty, Inc., 346 Ga. App. at 562–63, 816 S.E.2d at 513.
117. GA. CONST. art. III, § 6, para. 5(c)(3); see also O.C.G.A. § 13-8-50 (2019). For a
more in-depth legislative and political history of the restrictive covenant constitutional
amendment, see Haas et al., supra note 1, at 137–38.
118. See Cox v. Altus Healthcare & Hospice, Inc., 308 Ga. App. 28, 31, 706 S.E.2d 660,
664 (2011).
119. Vulcan Steel Structures, Inc. v. McCarty, 329 Ga. App. 220, 220, 764 S.E.2d 458,
459 (2014).
120. Cox, 308 Ga. App. at 31, 706 S.E.2d at 664; see also W.R. Grace & Co., Dearborn
Div. v. Mouyal, 262 Ga. 464, 465, 422 S.E.2d 529, 531 (1992).

[9] LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT-BP (DO NOT DELETE)

2019]

11/26/2019 11:08 AM

LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT

151

Continued employment is sufficient consideration for employers to
enforce new agreements121 except when the employers are already
obligated to a specific term; then, employers must offer additional
consideration (monetary payment or other benefits) to support new
restrictive covenants.122
In CarpetCare Multiservices, LLC v. Carle,123 the court of appeals
held that in order for a non-compete covenant to be enforceable, it is
statutorily required to contain geographical restrictions. 124 Carpetcare
Multiservices, LLC (Carpetcare) sued a former independent contractor
for violating the terms of a non-compete covenant. The trial court found
that the covenant was void and unenforceable because it failed to
specify a geographical restriction. 125 The court of appeals affirmed. 126
Under O.C.G.A. § 13-8-53(a), “[e]nforcement of contracts that restrict
competition during the term of a restrictive covenant, so long as such
restrictions are reasonable in time, geographic area, and scope of
prohibited activities, shall be permitted.” 127 Also, for non-competes:
The phrase “the territory where the employee is working at the time
of termination” or similar language shall be considered sufficient as a
description of geographic areas if the person or entity bound by the
restraint can reasonably determine the maximum reasonable scope of
the restraint at the time of termination.128

The court also held that geographic restrictions in a non-compete
covenant are reasonable provided:
(A) The total distance encompassed by the provisions of the covenant
also is reasonable; (B) The agreement contains a list of particular
competitors as prohibited employers for a limited period of time after
the term of employment or a business or commercial relationship; or
(C) Both subparagraphs (A) and (B) . . . .129

121. See Thomas v. Coastal Indus. Servs., Inc., 214 Ga. 832, 832, 108 S.E.2d 328, 329
(1959).
122. See Glisson v. Global Sec. Servs., LLC, 287 Ga. App. 640, 641–42, 653 S.E.2d 85,
87 (2007).
123. 347 Ga. App. 497, 819 S.E.2d 894 (2018).
124. Id. at 500, 819 S.E.2d at 897 (citing O.C.G.A. § 13-8-53(a) (2019)).
125. Id. at 497, 819 S.E.2d at 895; see O.C.G.A. § 13-8-53(a).
126. CarpetCare Multiservs., LLC, 347 Ga. App. at 497, 819 S.E.2d at 895.
127. Id. at 498, 819 S.E.2d at 896 (quoting O.C.G.A. § 13-8-53(a)).
128. Id. (quoting O.C.G.A. § 13-8-53(c)(2) (2019)).
129. Id. at 499, 819 S.E.2d at 896 (quoting O.C.G.A. § 13-8-56(2) (2019)).
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The court also noted the requirement for non-compete covenants to
contain geographical restrictions does not apply to non-solicitation
covenants under Georgia law.130
In Kennedy v. Shave Barber Co., LLC,131 the court of appeals held
that Shave Barber Co., LLC’s (the Shave) non-compete covenant (the
covenant) with Kennedy, a former employee, was not unreasonable or
too broad to be enforced.132 The covenant contained a geographic
restriction of a three-mile radius from the Shave, prohibitions on
soliciting its customers and employees for one year after employment,
and prohibitions on selling grooming products and services in
competition with the Shave for two years after employment. Kennedy
entered into the non-compete covenant with the Shave at the beginning
of her employment as a stylist in 2016. In 2017, Kennedy left the Shave
and opened a salon located within three miles from the barbershop. The
trial court granted the Shave an injunction enjoining Kennedy from
further violating the provisions of the non-compete covenant.133
The court of appeals held that a covenant not to compete is
enforceable against an employee “‘in possession of selective or
specialized skills, learning, or abilities or customer contacts, customer
information, or confidential information . . . ’134 who ‘[c]ustomarily and
regularly solicit for the employer customers or prospective
customers.’”135
The court also held that the geographical restriction was not
unreasonable and uncertain because “[w]henever a description of
activities, products, or services, or geographic areas, is required by this
Code section, any description that provides fair notice of the maximum
reasonable scope of the restraint shall satisfy such requirement . . . .”136
In this case, the Shave had a clear definition of the geographic
restriction the non-compete covenant covered, a three-mile radius from
the Shave’s Virginia Highlands location; therefore, the geographic
restriction was reasonable.137
The court also held that the Shave had a legitimate business interest
in justifying the extent of the non-compete provision.138 When an

130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.

Id. at 499, 819 S.E.2d at 897 (citing O.C.G.A. § 13-8-53(b) (2019)).
348 Ga. App. 298, 822 S.E.2d 606 (2018).
Id. at 309, 822 S.E.2d at 615.
Id. at 299–301, 822 S.E.2d at 609–10.
Id. at 303, 822 S.E.2d at 611 (quoting O.C.G.A. § 13-8-51(5)(C) (2019)).
Id. (quoting O.C.G.A. § 13-8-53(a)(1)).
Id. at 304, 822 S.E.2d at 612 (quoting O.C.G.A. § 13-8-53(c)(1) (2019)).
Id. at 304, 822 S.E.2d at 612.
Id. at 305, 822 S.E.2d at 612.
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employer is seeking the enforcement of a restrictive covenant, it has to
“plead and prove the existence of one or more legitimate business
interests justifying the restrictive covenant.”139 This includes
“‘[s]ubstantial relationships with specific prospective or existing
customers . . . or clients’ and ‘client good will.’”140 The court held that
because the Shave had invested a considerable amount of time and
energy into establishing a client base and maintaining their goodwill,
they had a legitimate business interest in protecting it. 141
As for the types of activities restricted, selling men’s grooming
services and products within a three-mile radius of the Shave was a
restricted activity only if, in so doing, Kennedy competed with the
Shave; the court held these restrictions were reasonable. 142 Because the
non-compete covenant did not prevent Kennedy from working in a retail
establishment selling grooming products or from working as a stylist
outside of a three-mile radius from the Shave, the scope of the
prohibited activities was not unreasonable. 143
In Blair v. Pantera Enterprises, Inc.,144 the Georgia Court of Appeals
held that, under Georgia’s Restrictive Covenants Act, 145 a backhoe
operator was not a “key employee” of an industrial contractor. 146 Blair
worked as a backhoe operator for Pantera and was known for having a
good work ethic, having a positive attitude, and for being reliable. One
of Pantera’s customers was Norfolk Southern, who quickly caught on to
Blair’s positive attitude and the work he did while working for
Pantera.147 “In 2012, Pantera required Blair to sign a non-compete
agreement in order to continue being assigned to Norfolk Southern.” 148
“Under the terms of the non-compete agreement, Blair agreed that he
would not operate a backhoe on railways owned or leased by Norfolk
Southern in its Georgia Operating Division for any entity or person for
a two-year period after ending his employment with Pantera.” 149 In
2017, Blair left Pantera for Southern Design Materials, Inc. (SDM), and
as a result, Norfolk Southern transferred its business over to SDM so

139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.

Id. (quoting O.C.G.A. § 13-8-55 (2019)).
Id. (quoting O.C.G.A. § 13-8-51(9)(C)–(D) (2019)).
Id.
Id. at 305–06, 822 S.E.2d at 613.
Id.
349 Ga. App. 846, 824 S.E.2d 711 (2019).
O.C.G.A. §§ 13-8-50–13-8-59 (2019).
Blair, 349 Ga. App. at 846–47, 824 S.E.2d at 712.
Id. at 848, 824 S.E.2d at 713.
Id. at 848, 824 S.E.2d at 712.
Id. at 848, 824 S.E.2d at 712–13.
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they could continue to work with Blair and because Norfolk did not
believe Pantera had a suitable replacement for Blair once he left. 150
Pantera filed a complaint “seeking to enjoin Blair from operating a
backhoe for Norfolk Southern in its territory for the two-year period
provided in the non-compete agreement.”151 “The trial court granted
Pantera the requested injunctive relief.”152 Blair argued that the trial
court erred in finding he was a “key employee” under the Act. 153
On appeal, the court examined whether both sentences in O.C.G.A.
§ 13-8-51(8) had to apply in order for an employee to be considered a
“key employee,” which would have subjected Blair to coverage under the
Act.154 Under this section a “key employee” is:
an employee who, by reason of the employer’s investment of time,
training, money, trust, exposure to the public, or exposure to
customers, vendors, or other business relationships during the course
of the employee’s employment with the employer, has gained a high
level of notoriety, fame, reputation, or public persona as the
employer’s representative or spokesperson or has gained a high level
of influence or credibility with the employer’s customers, vendors, or
other business relationships or is intimately involved in the planning
for or direction of the business of the employer or a defined unit of
the business of the employer. Such term also means an employee in
possession of selective or specialized skills, learning, or abilities or
customer contacts or customer information who has obtained such
skills, learning, abilities, contacts, or information by reason of having
worked for the employer.155

The court held that both sentences in the section must apply in order
to be considered a “key employee.”156 Pantera claimed that Blair had “a
high level of notoriety, fame, reputation, or public persona as the
employer’s representative.”157 However, the court noted:
[E]ven if Blair’s good reputation with one customer [was] sufficient
for him to have a “high level of notoriety, fame, reputation, or public
persona as the employer’s representative,” he would be a key
employee only if his “high level of notoriety, fame, reputation, or

150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.

Id. at 848, 824 S.E.2d at 713.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 848–49, 824 S.E.2d at 713; O.C.G.A. § 13-8-51(8) (2019).
Blair, 349 Ga. App. at 850, 824 S.E.2d at 714 (quoting O.C.G.A. § 13-8-51(8)).
Id. at 851, 824 S.E.2d at 714.
Id. at 851, 824 S.E.2d at 715.
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public persona as the employer’s representative” was gained “by
reason of the employer’s investment of time, training, money, trust,
exposure to the public, or exposure to customers, vendors, or other
business relationships during the course of the employee’s
employment with the employer . . . .”158

The court held that Blair’s reputation was a result of his own doing,
not Pantera’s; therefore, he was not a “key employee” under the Act.159
VI. CONCLUSION
As Georgia grows so do the challenges that Georgia’s employers face.
The increasingly complex web of federal labor and employment laws,
and their Georgia corollaries require the practitioner to keep abreast of
latest developments.

158. Id. (citing O.C.G.A. § 13-8-51(8)).
159. Id. at 852, 824 S.E.2d at 715.
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